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Analysis: The Kings' breakdown: Decline caused by poor decisions
Management is paying for its hefty contracts and ill-advised trades.
By Scott Howard-Cooper - Bee Staff Writer
Last Updated 12:42 am PDT Sunday, May 6, 2007
The events played out turn by treacherous turn, until suddenly it was May 2007 and the Kings had walked themselves into knots.
A franchise once built on stability -- same bosses on the sideline, in the front office and in the ownership for eight years, mostly the same featured players -- was hunting for its third coach in as many seasons. Mike Bibby, the last holdover from the 2001-02 team that reached Game 7 of the Western Conference finals, likely would be shopped in the months ahead, just as he had been at the February trade deadline. The famed home-court advantage of Arco Arena had been replaced by the new-world order of losses and empty seats.
The Kings were 61-21 and Pacific Division champions in that 2001-02 season. They were 33-49 and in last place in 2006-07 and out of the playoffs for the first time since 1998. According to the Elias Sports Bureau, their five consecutive seasons of decline -- sometimes slight (from 61 wins to 59 in 2002-03) and sometimes drastic (44 wins last season to 33) -- are tied for the second-longest skid in NBA history.
The flameout has been that pronounced ... in the blink of a "Why?"
* * *
Welcome to the hangover.
Age often catches up to teams. Injuries might play a factor. Some front offices bail out of a winning situation to get ahead of the inevitable rebuilding process (such as the breakup of Michael Jordan's Bulls) or to get away from problem situations (the Trail Blazers ridding themselves of Rasheed Wallace, Ruben Patterson, et al.).
The decline of the Kings can be traced to management decisions.
Bibby turns 29 next Sunday, Brad Miller is 31, Ron Artest 27 and Kevin Martin, having gone from part-time starter to the foundation of the future in one season, is 24. So it's not age. There hasn't been any more of a torrent of injuries than other franchises face, and none that could be considered fate-turning since knee surgery limited Chris Webber to 23 games in 2003-04.
More likely, with the obvious benefit of hindsight that co-owners Joe and Gavin Maloof and team basketball president Geoff Petrie didn't have, a series of choices has led to where the Kings are -- in a bad spot in the standings and with little in place for the future. Martin is the only starter they can rightly claim can be counted on two seasons from now, meaning this is the beginning of renovations and, bold bottom line, that it could get worse than 33-49 if the youth movement comes to be.
The front office badly misread the ability of the current team to win, banking on a hope that did not exist. No significant trades were made last summer to accelerate the trip to the future. No big salaries have been shed, meaning Miller is still on the cap for three more seasons and $34.1 million, Bibby for two and $28 million and 30-year-old Shareef Abdur-Rahim for three and $18.6 million.
Kenny Thomas also has three years remaining, but taking that on was part of the cost of moving Webber and his über-contract to Philadelphia in 2005. Bibby, Miller and Abdur-Rahim all got free-agent deals that increased each season, as opposed to the option of front-loading the contracts to be less of a burden on the cap as the players aged, making them easier to trade.
Bad contracts from the glory days had gotten the Kings in trouble before. Doug Christie signed for a reported $48 million over seven years, then started to break down after about three seasons, before management dumped that problem by trading him to Orlando in January 2005.
In the real sign of the ground opening below the Kings, Christie for Cuttino Mobley turned out to be the start of another problem.
Mobley lasted until the end of that season -- playing just 45 games -- before leaving as a free agent. The Kings traded for his replacement, Bonzi Wells.
Wells lasted until the end of the 2005-06 season before leaving as a free agent. The Kings plugged in his replacement, Martin.
It took two trades and one draft pick (Martin) to correct the issue of Christie's advancing age and bad contract and install a shooting guard on more than temp duty. And that was with luck on their side. Imagine the impact on the salary cap -- and on Martin -- if Wells had accepted the $38.5 million free-agent offer last summer.
Petrie, through the other problems, had continued as a draft star. Martin came with the 26th choice in 2004 and needed all of one season as a starter to average 20.2 points. And not only did the versatile Francisco García develop into a key reserve in his second season after going No. 23 in 2005, just two players picked later have done better -- David Lee (30th) with the Knicks and Monta Ellis (40th) with the Warriors. Most everybody else whiffed there, too.
The Kings were not missing in the draft, remembering that the 2002 selection of Dan Dickau was made for Atlanta as part of a prearranged deal for a future first-rounder. The biggest setback in that area was not protecting 2001 selection Gerald Wallace in the expansion draft and having him develop into a talent in Charlotte, except that Wallace had three years of little progress in Sacramento, and exposing him at that point was entirely understandable.
The Kings were, however, missing in other areas.
The team was already backsliding as it faced the possibility of trading Peja Stojakovic, undependable in the playoffs and nearing a big payday as a free agent. But when the deal came, it wasn't for a package of promising prospects and/or draft picks, or even for an expiring contract that would create salary cap relief. Anything to build for the future.
It was for Artest. He was young enough (26 at the time) and had a reasonable contract for a player of his considerable abilities ($22.3 million for the three remaining full seasons), but he also had well-known demons. Supreme defenders who can power to the basket when they have the ball don't get traded twice in four years just because.
The Kings swapped a tradable commodity, Stojakovic, on Jan. 25, 2006, for someone whose actions had been less trustworthy than anyone's in the league. They got an exemplary finish to that season, raising hopes.
Then they got Bad Ron.
The Artest of 2006-07 was at the center of a locker room that completed the plummet from historically good, in that 2001-02 trip to the conference finals, to splintered. His shot selection, although he finished seventh in field-goal accuracy, and decision making with the ball wore out teammates more than anything from his personal life, until his future with the Kings had become another offseason decision for management.
And then there was the sideline.
The move to gauge the interest of Phil Jackson in the 2005 offseason with Rick Adelman still the coach was a clear signal of Adelman's tenuous standing, yet he was retained when it was obvious ownership did not believe in him. No acceptable replacements apparently were available. To their credit, players did not roll over on Adelman, the way other rosters would disregard a lame duck, and, in fact, had their best stretch the second half.
When the time came to replace Adelman, the list of candidates interviewed would never be confused with an exhaustive search. John Whisenant, the coach of the Monarchs, had never been on an NBA bench and had never been the head coach of a men's team at a higher level than Arizona Western or the minor-league New Mexico Slam for one season.
Warriors assistant Mario Elie, while regarded by many as a bright prospect, had three years of bench experience. Grizzlies assistant Eric Musselman, a former head coach at Golden State, easily had the superior résumé and a reputation as a good basketball man who worked tirelessly and with great energy.
The Warriors called him "Eddie Haskell," after the character in "Leave It To Beaver," for a reason, though. The job candidate in Sacramento was polished and organized in interviews with the bosses and handed over a thorough written report on the team and its players, just as he had done at Golden State. His personality after being hired, however, soon led to chasms with players and the front office. Just as had happened at Golden State.
The Kings gave Musselman a three-year deal and a roster that was kept together to win in the moment. No one could have imagined the world would crash down around them, with a last-place finish in the Pacific, the coach being arrested on a charge of driving under the influence and Artest being arrested on a charge of spousal abuse.
It was like nothing the Kings of the Maloof/Petrie era had lived before. It was May 2007, and it was their new life, decision by treacherous decision.
About the writer: The Bee's Scott Howard-Cooper can be reached at showard-cooper@sacbee.com.
Analysis: The Kings' breakdown: Decline caused by poor decisions
Management is paying for its hefty contracts and ill-advised trades.
By Scott Howard-Cooper - Bee Staff Writer
Last Updated 12:42 am PDT Sunday, May 6, 2007
The events played out turn by treacherous turn, until suddenly it was May 2007 and the Kings had walked themselves into knots.
A franchise once built on stability -- same bosses on the sideline, in the front office and in the ownership for eight years, mostly the same featured players -- was hunting for its third coach in as many seasons. Mike Bibby, the last holdover from the 2001-02 team that reached Game 7 of the Western Conference finals, likely would be shopped in the months ahead, just as he had been at the February trade deadline. The famed home-court advantage of Arco Arena had been replaced by the new-world order of losses and empty seats.
The Kings were 61-21 and Pacific Division champions in that 2001-02 season. They were 33-49 and in last place in 2006-07 and out of the playoffs for the first time since 1998. According to the Elias Sports Bureau, their five consecutive seasons of decline -- sometimes slight (from 61 wins to 59 in 2002-03) and sometimes drastic (44 wins last season to 33) -- are tied for the second-longest skid in NBA history.
The flameout has been that pronounced ... in the blink of a "Why?"
* * *
Welcome to the hangover.
Age often catches up to teams. Injuries might play a factor. Some front offices bail out of a winning situation to get ahead of the inevitable rebuilding process (such as the breakup of Michael Jordan's Bulls) or to get away from problem situations (the Trail Blazers ridding themselves of Rasheed Wallace, Ruben Patterson, et al.).
The decline of the Kings can be traced to management decisions.
Bibby turns 29 next Sunday, Brad Miller is 31, Ron Artest 27 and Kevin Martin, having gone from part-time starter to the foundation of the future in one season, is 24. So it's not age. There hasn't been any more of a torrent of injuries than other franchises face, and none that could be considered fate-turning since knee surgery limited Chris Webber to 23 games in 2003-04.
More likely, with the obvious benefit of hindsight that co-owners Joe and Gavin Maloof and team basketball president Geoff Petrie didn't have, a series of choices has led to where the Kings are -- in a bad spot in the standings and with little in place for the future. Martin is the only starter they can rightly claim can be counted on two seasons from now, meaning this is the beginning of renovations and, bold bottom line, that it could get worse than 33-49 if the youth movement comes to be.
The front office badly misread the ability of the current team to win, banking on a hope that did not exist. No significant trades were made last summer to accelerate the trip to the future. No big salaries have been shed, meaning Miller is still on the cap for three more seasons and $34.1 million, Bibby for two and $28 million and 30-year-old Shareef Abdur-Rahim for three and $18.6 million.
Kenny Thomas also has three years remaining, but taking that on was part of the cost of moving Webber and his über-contract to Philadelphia in 2005. Bibby, Miller and Abdur-Rahim all got free-agent deals that increased each season, as opposed to the option of front-loading the contracts to be less of a burden on the cap as the players aged, making them easier to trade.
Bad contracts from the glory days had gotten the Kings in trouble before. Doug Christie signed for a reported $48 million over seven years, then started to break down after about three seasons, before management dumped that problem by trading him to Orlando in January 2005.
In the real sign of the ground opening below the Kings, Christie for Cuttino Mobley turned out to be the start of another problem.
Mobley lasted until the end of that season -- playing just 45 games -- before leaving as a free agent. The Kings traded for his replacement, Bonzi Wells.
Wells lasted until the end of the 2005-06 season before leaving as a free agent. The Kings plugged in his replacement, Martin.
It took two trades and one draft pick (Martin) to correct the issue of Christie's advancing age and bad contract and install a shooting guard on more than temp duty. And that was with luck on their side. Imagine the impact on the salary cap -- and on Martin -- if Wells had accepted the $38.5 million free-agent offer last summer.
Petrie, through the other problems, had continued as a draft star. Martin came with the 26th choice in 2004 and needed all of one season as a starter to average 20.2 points. And not only did the versatile Francisco García develop into a key reserve in his second season after going No. 23 in 2005, just two players picked later have done better -- David Lee (30th) with the Knicks and Monta Ellis (40th) with the Warriors. Most everybody else whiffed there, too.
The Kings were not missing in the draft, remembering that the 2002 selection of Dan Dickau was made for Atlanta as part of a prearranged deal for a future first-rounder. The biggest setback in that area was not protecting 2001 selection Gerald Wallace in the expansion draft and having him develop into a talent in Charlotte, except that Wallace had three years of little progress in Sacramento, and exposing him at that point was entirely understandable.
The Kings were, however, missing in other areas.
The team was already backsliding as it faced the possibility of trading Peja Stojakovic, undependable in the playoffs and nearing a big payday as a free agent. But when the deal came, it wasn't for a package of promising prospects and/or draft picks, or even for an expiring contract that would create salary cap relief. Anything to build for the future.
It was for Artest. He was young enough (26 at the time) and had a reasonable contract for a player of his considerable abilities ($22.3 million for the three remaining full seasons), but he also had well-known demons. Supreme defenders who can power to the basket when they have the ball don't get traded twice in four years just because.
The Kings swapped a tradable commodity, Stojakovic, on Jan. 25, 2006, for someone whose actions had been less trustworthy than anyone's in the league. They got an exemplary finish to that season, raising hopes.
Then they got Bad Ron.
The Artest of 2006-07 was at the center of a locker room that completed the plummet from historically good, in that 2001-02 trip to the conference finals, to splintered. His shot selection, although he finished seventh in field-goal accuracy, and decision making with the ball wore out teammates more than anything from his personal life, until his future with the Kings had become another offseason decision for management.
And then there was the sideline.
The move to gauge the interest of Phil Jackson in the 2005 offseason with Rick Adelman still the coach was a clear signal of Adelman's tenuous standing, yet he was retained when it was obvious ownership did not believe in him. No acceptable replacements apparently were available. To their credit, players did not roll over on Adelman, the way other rosters would disregard a lame duck, and, in fact, had their best stretch the second half.
When the time came to replace Adelman, the list of candidates interviewed would never be confused with an exhaustive search. John Whisenant, the coach of the Monarchs, had never been on an NBA bench and had never been the head coach of a men's team at a higher level than Arizona Western or the minor-league New Mexico Slam for one season.
Warriors assistant Mario Elie, while regarded by many as a bright prospect, had three years of bench experience. Grizzlies assistant Eric Musselman, a former head coach at Golden State, easily had the superior résumé and a reputation as a good basketball man who worked tirelessly and with great energy.
The Warriors called him "Eddie Haskell," after the character in "Leave It To Beaver," for a reason, though. The job candidate in Sacramento was polished and organized in interviews with the bosses and handed over a thorough written report on the team and its players, just as he had done at Golden State. His personality after being hired, however, soon led to chasms with players and the front office. Just as had happened at Golden State.
The Kings gave Musselman a three-year deal and a roster that was kept together to win in the moment. No one could have imagined the world would crash down around them, with a last-place finish in the Pacific, the coach being arrested on a charge of driving under the influence and Artest being arrested on a charge of spousal abuse.
It was like nothing the Kings of the Maloof/Petrie era had lived before. It was May 2007, and it was their new life, decision by treacherous decision.
About the writer: The Bee's Scott Howard-Cooper can be reached at showard-cooper@sacbee.com.
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