[Note: large mod edits to remove material in the first two sections of the post, first paragraph largely redacted but reconstructed for narrative sense]
Yesterday, as Dallas comes to Sacramento for two games, I had some thoughts that seem to be exploring new territory with regard to the 2018 draft.
posters did confirm my memory of vlade announcing in advance of the draft that bagley was the choice (and agreed with me that that was a terrible strategy).
what did not get a response was my question as to whether anyone was aware that the front office knew about the luka/trae pick swap being worked on (while vlade fiddled).
no one had any knowledge (or link) on the subject of "whether they knew" (what dallas and atlanta were planning).
Here is a good example of how a smart gm could alter the course of a franchise (and indeed, the future of other franchises), while a gm who was asleep at the wheel could, with one move (or a failure to move), could set a franchise back for YEARS.
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new ideas:
Franklin Mieuli, one of the last of the not super rich individual owners had finally sold the Warriors to the former Milwaukee Bucks owners a couple of years prior to the 1987-88 season and Don Nelson (contractually bound to the Bucks at the time) suggested that they hire a young George Karl (who had had some success with the worst owner in the league - the infamous Ted Stepien in Cleveland) and the Warriors signed Karl to a three year contract.
It had paid off immediately as Karl took a flawed team to the playoffs in 1986-87, but it all collapsed the next season..
The 1987-88 season was a terrible year for the Warriors. What goes around comes around and the team that pulled the biggest upset in NBA Finals history in 1975 finished 1987-88 with a 20-62 record, which earned them the fifth pick in the 1988 draft.
They traded two of their marketable players at midseason (Sleepy Floyd and Joe Barely Cares) for a gimpy Ralph Sampson who was clearly damaged goods before he ever got to Sacramento. In 1987, they had drafted Tellis Frank in the first round of the 1987 draft and totally whiffed. Their lottery pick in 1986 (Chris Washburn, selected third) turned out to be a bigger bust than Marvin Bagley could ever be. Except for Chris Mullin, the cupboard was bare.
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Don Nelson came in as GM after the Sampson trade and soon fired Karl (Ed Gregory finished the season). 1988 was his first draft and he would then be coaching his pick to start 1988-89 as GM/Coach. It was his rebuild.
As we know, Nelson drafted Mitch Richmond who took them back to the playoffs in 1988 and won Rookie of the Year.
The following year he drafted Tim Hardaway as the 14th pick (who says you can't find value in the middle of the first round?), getting by with Winston Garland - father of Darius - as point guard in the interim). Together with Chris Mullin, they became RunTMC.
But Nelson made a major mistake when he broke up the RunTMC team in 1991 by trading Mitch to the Kings for the chance to draft Billy Owens at #3, a relative bust (based on where he was drafted and who he was traded for) who also later played in Sactown.
However, the Kings (who later were able to deal Mitch for Chris Webber) almost never got a chance to trade for Richmond. Mitch almost never became a Warrior (and likely, never would have become a King and brought the Kings Webber).
Mitch probably would have been drafted by Phoenix, had not GM Nelson been wide awake.
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Back then, there were a series of all-star games for college seniors who hoped to be drafted (there were still three rounds in 1988 - down from seven rounds just a year earlier). Two NBA Coaches brought their (then skimpy) staffs and worked with the collegians. As you can imagine, that gave those two coaches, usually from teams not playoff bound, an advantage in judging talent. That year the two coaches were Nelson and the Suns' Cotton Fitzsimmons (the Suns were 28-54 in 87-88)..
Both coaches could clearly see that although there were going to be a lot of excellent shooting guards in that year's draft, Mitch Richmond stood out, even in a strong group. (4 of the top 8 selections were two guards and Phoenix still wound up with Dan Majerle at #14).
Nelson was afraid that Fitzsimmons would trade up to #4 to grab Mitch (the Suns had two picks, #7 and #14 to offer New Jersey) and that has remained about the going rate - Vlade traded down for #15 (Justin Jackson) and #20 (Harry Giles) giving up his #10 pick in 2017.
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here is a link to the 1988 draft:
1988 NBA Draft | Basketball-Reference.com
The Clippers also had two first round picks, #1 and #6 and all spring they were negotiating to trade for Charles Barkley, who, like Cousins in Sacramento, had worn out his welcome (this was the Charles of "I'm no role model - parents should be role models, so just do your jobs and don't ask me to be a role model for your kids").
Philly had agreed to a package of three number one picks for Charles but the two teams differed on the "which" and "when" questions. Naturally the 76ers wanted both 1988 picks and a future number 1. That was a definite "no" for the Clippers who wanted to part with the #6 pick in 1988 and two future number ones. Philly agreed to take one current and two futures but in that case,. they wanted the first pick in the draft in 1988 (and two future number ones), leaving the Clippers with the 1988 6th pick.
And there they deadlocked. In retrospect, the Clips should have taken that deal but they had their hearts set on collegiate player of the year, Danny Manning, who, like Sampson, was dogged by injuries and so, is generally considered a bust at his draft position.
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But because the two teams had been having a civil conversation (even though in the end they could not agree), they did at the last minute work out a deal to swap picks in the first round, LAC moving from #6 to #3 and paying with a future #1 pick (as we saw from the Atlanta/Dallas Lukadiva deal that price has remained largely the same). That meant one less potential partner for Fitzsimmons to move ahead of Nelson.
So, the Clips were set to draft Manning #1. Indiana was known to be taking Rick Smits, the best center in the draft at #2 and then Philly was going to draft Charles Smith at #3 (the 6'10 Charles Smith, not the point guard Charles Smith) for LAC.. Then, at #6, the Clips would draft Hersey Hawkins for Philly (Rex Chapman went #8 and had Hawkins been gone, he would have been the pick).
Nelson knew/learned all this, but his problem was still that Fitzsimmons might offer his two firsts to move from #7 to #4 (the Warriors drafted fifth) and select Richmond.
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General Managers succeed or fail based in part on their communication skills. They are going to talk often with their counterparts whether they really have an idea or suggestion to float or whether they are spreading disinformation.
So, Nelson calls New jersey under the pretext of asking if their front office knew anything about something that they would NOT know anything about (because he made it up), as a way to have a conversation to make his real point.
He says, "I'm hearing that Indiana is having doubts about Smits and might go small - you hear anything about that?" (some people questioned taking Smits that high since he played - against weak competition - at tiny Marist College).
Naturally he gets a "first I've heard about it" and continues to chat until asked who he likes in the draft (which he KNOWS he WILL be asked, since if New Jersey makes the swap with Phoenix, Nelson will be picking before they select..
Nelson has heard from another GM that the Nets like Chris Morris as the best of the shooting guards - totally a bad choice, but it's really a crap shoot in many cases, So he replies, "We're thinking Chris Morris might be our guy if he's there at #5". New Jersey just says, "Yeah we like him too".
That was enough to stop New Jersey from being interested in helping Phoenix move from #7 to #4 (for a future pick) and Fitzsimmons later told Nelson he was sure NJ was going to take the offer - and then suddenly they lost interest (Nelson explained why - the two were actually quite friendly and Phoenix got Majerle, so, they filled their need anyway).
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The point I am illustrating is that a good GM should not only be considering their choice (in the draft), but they should also gain knowledge of what everyone else who could affect their selection is going to do. These days, with expanded front offices and many, many assistant coaches (Nelson had just two in 1987-88 and five years later, when he offered Greg Popovich a lifeline after the entire staff was fired in San Antonio, his staff had grown all the way to three assistant coaches - Pop stayed with the Warriors for two seasons waiting for the new regime in SA to fail and then became GM at San Antonio before hiring himself as Coach).,
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Someone in the front office should be reading every mock draft and scouring the local media in NBA cities for hints (like who is working out who) as well as following scoopsters like Woj. Someone from a franchise should be calling the front office of other teams every week (or every day leading up to the draft), even if you have to make up a (phony) reason for calling, because what your team can do depends on what other teams do. Information is the coin of the realm.
NEVER should Atlanta and Dallas have been able to set up the Trae/Luka pick swap without the Kings front office knowing what was going on.- that kind of mistake just CAN'T happen (most teams drafting lower would have no particular need to know but Sacramento HAD to know that the Trae/Luka swap was finalizing).
Of course, I don't know for certain that they were NOT aware.
Does anyone have a link that would establish their knowledge prior to draft day?
But it seems to me like there was either gross incompetence involved OR (caution - conspiracy theory unfolding), someone knew but deliberately did not say (yeah, probably Vlade).
Because we DO know that there was disagreement over the pick, Vlade and Brandon wanting Marvin while Joerger (and Vivek more tepidly) wanting Luka;
Now, IF the Kings knew and were openly discussing their options regarding the proposed Dallas/Atlanta pick swap, then WHY would not Joerger have said (to convince Vivek) that if the Kings DON'T make the deal with Dallas (swapping #2 for #5) for a future first rounder, then, in essence, you are giving up a first round pick to draft Bagley over Luka and how can THAT be worth the price?
Sure you are gambling by trading down (not that Vlade hadn't done plenty of both previously), but when you get to draft day, you have choices:
One, 50-50 that Marvin is still there at #5 and you got one of the guys you wanted AND a future number one.
Assuming that Memphis stays with their plan at #4,, Atlanta either has to draft Trae Young at #3 or offer the Kings something NOT to draft Young (at #5), should they find a trading partner (below #5) who wants someone - probably Marvin - that Atlanta would draft and can draft Young for Atlanta.
Then you have a Mexican standoff:
Kings: "Give us something or we'll draft Trae at #5"
Atlanta: "Go right ahead and we will keep Marvin at #3 and neither of us gets who they really want"
Hopefully, the Kings knew about these options. But I would not be surprised if Vlade/Brandon knew of the Dallas/Atlanta proposed pick swap, but kept it to themselves to be certain of getting Vivek to sign off on drafting the Marvin they wanted.
Tinfoil hat OFF as we return to the current regime.
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I have not made up my mind about Monte's competence. You can't blame him for the Bogi fiasco and he has drafted the best guy available, twice (although duplicating positioning) BUT I question the "Hield to Lakers" misstep.
The reason (and I just realized this recently) is that this was a FIVE TEAM trade.- so, HOW does Monte not know that the Lakers are angling for Westbrook (instead of Buddy)? Locally, this was portrayed as the Lakers "playing" the Kings, but really, Monte should have had enough ears around the league to know when FIVE teams are setting up a major trade and realized that "Buddy" was a fallback position in case the Russ trade collapsed. Monte was no "victim". But was he fully informed? If not, that's on him.
Yesterday, as Dallas comes to Sacramento for two games, I had some thoughts that seem to be exploring new territory with regard to the 2018 draft.
posters did confirm my memory of vlade announcing in advance of the draft that bagley was the choice (and agreed with me that that was a terrible strategy).
what did not get a response was my question as to whether anyone was aware that the front office knew about the luka/trae pick swap being worked on (while vlade fiddled).
no one had any knowledge (or link) on the subject of "whether they knew" (what dallas and atlanta were planning).
Here is a good example of how a smart gm could alter the course of a franchise (and indeed, the future of other franchises), while a gm who was asleep at the wheel could, with one move (or a failure to move), could set a franchise back for YEARS.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
new ideas:
Franklin Mieuli, one of the last of the not super rich individual owners had finally sold the Warriors to the former Milwaukee Bucks owners a couple of years prior to the 1987-88 season and Don Nelson (contractually bound to the Bucks at the time) suggested that they hire a young George Karl (who had had some success with the worst owner in the league - the infamous Ted Stepien in Cleveland) and the Warriors signed Karl to a three year contract.
It had paid off immediately as Karl took a flawed team to the playoffs in 1986-87, but it all collapsed the next season..
The 1987-88 season was a terrible year for the Warriors. What goes around comes around and the team that pulled the biggest upset in NBA Finals history in 1975 finished 1987-88 with a 20-62 record, which earned them the fifth pick in the 1988 draft.
They traded two of their marketable players at midseason (Sleepy Floyd and Joe Barely Cares) for a gimpy Ralph Sampson who was clearly damaged goods before he ever got to Sacramento. In 1987, they had drafted Tellis Frank in the first round of the 1987 draft and totally whiffed. Their lottery pick in 1986 (Chris Washburn, selected third) turned out to be a bigger bust than Marvin Bagley could ever be. Except for Chris Mullin, the cupboard was bare.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Don Nelson came in as GM after the Sampson trade and soon fired Karl (Ed Gregory finished the season). 1988 was his first draft and he would then be coaching his pick to start 1988-89 as GM/Coach. It was his rebuild.
As we know, Nelson drafted Mitch Richmond who took them back to the playoffs in 1988 and won Rookie of the Year.
The following year he drafted Tim Hardaway as the 14th pick (who says you can't find value in the middle of the first round?), getting by with Winston Garland - father of Darius - as point guard in the interim). Together with Chris Mullin, they became RunTMC.
But Nelson made a major mistake when he broke up the RunTMC team in 1991 by trading Mitch to the Kings for the chance to draft Billy Owens at #3, a relative bust (based on where he was drafted and who he was traded for) who also later played in Sactown.
However, the Kings (who later were able to deal Mitch for Chris Webber) almost never got a chance to trade for Richmond. Mitch almost never became a Warrior (and likely, never would have become a King and brought the Kings Webber).
Mitch probably would have been drafted by Phoenix, had not GM Nelson been wide awake.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Back then, there were a series of all-star games for college seniors who hoped to be drafted (there were still three rounds in 1988 - down from seven rounds just a year earlier). Two NBA Coaches brought their (then skimpy) staffs and worked with the collegians. As you can imagine, that gave those two coaches, usually from teams not playoff bound, an advantage in judging talent. That year the two coaches were Nelson and the Suns' Cotton Fitzsimmons (the Suns were 28-54 in 87-88)..
Both coaches could clearly see that although there were going to be a lot of excellent shooting guards in that year's draft, Mitch Richmond stood out, even in a strong group. (4 of the top 8 selections were two guards and Phoenix still wound up with Dan Majerle at #14).
Nelson was afraid that Fitzsimmons would trade up to #4 to grab Mitch (the Suns had two picks, #7 and #14 to offer New Jersey) and that has remained about the going rate - Vlade traded down for #15 (Justin Jackson) and #20 (Harry Giles) giving up his #10 pick in 2017.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
here is a link to the 1988 draft:
1988 NBA Draft | Basketball-Reference.com
The Clippers also had two first round picks, #1 and #6 and all spring they were negotiating to trade for Charles Barkley, who, like Cousins in Sacramento, had worn out his welcome (this was the Charles of "I'm no role model - parents should be role models, so just do your jobs and don't ask me to be a role model for your kids").
Philly had agreed to a package of three number one picks for Charles but the two teams differed on the "which" and "when" questions. Naturally the 76ers wanted both 1988 picks and a future number 1. That was a definite "no" for the Clippers who wanted to part with the #6 pick in 1988 and two future number ones. Philly agreed to take one current and two futures but in that case,. they wanted the first pick in the draft in 1988 (and two future number ones), leaving the Clippers with the 1988 6th pick.
And there they deadlocked. In retrospect, the Clips should have taken that deal but they had their hearts set on collegiate player of the year, Danny Manning, who, like Sampson, was dogged by injuries and so, is generally considered a bust at his draft position.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But because the two teams had been having a civil conversation (even though in the end they could not agree), they did at the last minute work out a deal to swap picks in the first round, LAC moving from #6 to #3 and paying with a future #1 pick (as we saw from the Atlanta/Dallas Lukadiva deal that price has remained largely the same). That meant one less potential partner for Fitzsimmons to move ahead of Nelson.
So, the Clips were set to draft Manning #1. Indiana was known to be taking Rick Smits, the best center in the draft at #2 and then Philly was going to draft Charles Smith at #3 (the 6'10 Charles Smith, not the point guard Charles Smith) for LAC.. Then, at #6, the Clips would draft Hersey Hawkins for Philly (Rex Chapman went #8 and had Hawkins been gone, he would have been the pick).
Nelson knew/learned all this, but his problem was still that Fitzsimmons might offer his two firsts to move from #7 to #4 (the Warriors drafted fifth) and select Richmond.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Managers succeed or fail based in part on their communication skills. They are going to talk often with their counterparts whether they really have an idea or suggestion to float or whether they are spreading disinformation.
So, Nelson calls New jersey under the pretext of asking if their front office knew anything about something that they would NOT know anything about (because he made it up), as a way to have a conversation to make his real point.
He says, "I'm hearing that Indiana is having doubts about Smits and might go small - you hear anything about that?" (some people questioned taking Smits that high since he played - against weak competition - at tiny Marist College).
Naturally he gets a "first I've heard about it" and continues to chat until asked who he likes in the draft (which he KNOWS he WILL be asked, since if New Jersey makes the swap with Phoenix, Nelson will be picking before they select..
Nelson has heard from another GM that the Nets like Chris Morris as the best of the shooting guards - totally a bad choice, but it's really a crap shoot in many cases, So he replies, "We're thinking Chris Morris might be our guy if he's there at #5". New Jersey just says, "Yeah we like him too".
That was enough to stop New Jersey from being interested in helping Phoenix move from #7 to #4 (for a future pick) and Fitzsimmons later told Nelson he was sure NJ was going to take the offer - and then suddenly they lost interest (Nelson explained why - the two were actually quite friendly and Phoenix got Majerle, so, they filled their need anyway).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The point I am illustrating is that a good GM should not only be considering their choice (in the draft), but they should also gain knowledge of what everyone else who could affect their selection is going to do. These days, with expanded front offices and many, many assistant coaches (Nelson had just two in 1987-88 and five years later, when he offered Greg Popovich a lifeline after the entire staff was fired in San Antonio, his staff had grown all the way to three assistant coaches - Pop stayed with the Warriors for two seasons waiting for the new regime in SA to fail and then became GM at San Antonio before hiring himself as Coach).,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Someone in the front office should be reading every mock draft and scouring the local media in NBA cities for hints (like who is working out who) as well as following scoopsters like Woj. Someone from a franchise should be calling the front office of other teams every week (or every day leading up to the draft), even if you have to make up a (phony) reason for calling, because what your team can do depends on what other teams do. Information is the coin of the realm.
NEVER should Atlanta and Dallas have been able to set up the Trae/Luka pick swap without the Kings front office knowing what was going on.- that kind of mistake just CAN'T happen (most teams drafting lower would have no particular need to know but Sacramento HAD to know that the Trae/Luka swap was finalizing).
Of course, I don't know for certain that they were NOT aware.
Does anyone have a link that would establish their knowledge prior to draft day?
But it seems to me like there was either gross incompetence involved OR (caution - conspiracy theory unfolding), someone knew but deliberately did not say (yeah, probably Vlade).
Because we DO know that there was disagreement over the pick, Vlade and Brandon wanting Marvin while Joerger (and Vivek more tepidly) wanting Luka;
Now, IF the Kings knew and were openly discussing their options regarding the proposed Dallas/Atlanta pick swap, then WHY would not Joerger have said (to convince Vivek) that if the Kings DON'T make the deal with Dallas (swapping #2 for #5) for a future first rounder, then, in essence, you are giving up a first round pick to draft Bagley over Luka and how can THAT be worth the price?
Sure you are gambling by trading down (not that Vlade hadn't done plenty of both previously), but when you get to draft day, you have choices:
One, 50-50 that Marvin is still there at #5 and you got one of the guys you wanted AND a future number one.
Assuming that Memphis stays with their plan at #4,, Atlanta either has to draft Trae Young at #3 or offer the Kings something NOT to draft Young (at #5), should they find a trading partner (below #5) who wants someone - probably Marvin - that Atlanta would draft and can draft Young for Atlanta.
Then you have a Mexican standoff:
Kings: "Give us something or we'll draft Trae at #5"
Atlanta: "Go right ahead and we will keep Marvin at #3 and neither of us gets who they really want"
Hopefully, the Kings knew about these options. But I would not be surprised if Vlade/Brandon knew of the Dallas/Atlanta proposed pick swap, but kept it to themselves to be certain of getting Vivek to sign off on drafting the Marvin they wanted.
Tinfoil hat OFF as we return to the current regime.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I have not made up my mind about Monte's competence. You can't blame him for the Bogi fiasco and he has drafted the best guy available, twice (although duplicating positioning) BUT I question the "Hield to Lakers" misstep.
The reason (and I just realized this recently) is that this was a FIVE TEAM trade.- so, HOW does Monte not know that the Lakers are angling for Westbrook (instead of Buddy)? Locally, this was portrayed as the Lakers "playing" the Kings, but really, Monte should have had enough ears around the league to know when FIVE teams are setting up a major trade and realized that "Buddy" was a fallback position in case the Russ trade collapsed. Monte was no "victim". But was he fully informed? If not, that's on him.
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