Tetsujin
The Game Thread Dude
Of course they do this the one time the Kings might actually tank.
Yeah, but they won't take effect for a bit and won't impact this year's draft.
Of course they do this the one time the Kings might actually tank.
These ideas, which came from the league and its high-ranking officials, would theoretically dissuade non-playoff teams from sitting their starters for games throughout the season and provide reason to continue to try to win games, particularly down the stretch of a campaign.
As multiple sources described, the attempts to find solutions to tanking are not intended to deter rebuilding teams who use their players as normal but rather teams that deliberately manipulate their rosters down the stretch of a season to land a higher pick or a protection range.
It's really tricky to balance anti-tanking measures with serving genuine need in the basement of the league, because objective measures can and will be abused to game the system. For some reason, we're stuck on using objective measures to determine draft order.It's really tricky to balance anti-tanking measures with serving genuine need in the basement of the league, because not all drafts are created equal. There's a big difference between drafting Victor Wembanyama, Cooper Flagg, or even Cade Cunningham with the number 1 overall pick and, say, Zaccharie Risacher. I'm not at all supportive of a measure that would prevent teams from selecting in the top-four two years in a row. If you've got a top-four draft pick in a year in which the most vaunted prospects are Risacher, Alex Sarr, Reed Sheppard, and Stephon Castle, you're not going to be thrilled to be kept out of the draft that could potentially net you Cooper Flagg or Dylan Harper. I don't know that flattening the lottery odds has done much to help, because as this Tweet notes, it's a flawed system that delivers Wemby, Castle, and Harper to the Spurs, while a terrible team like the Wizards has largely been shut out of the best prospects across the last half-decade as they've put themselves on the path to a proper rebuild.
It's really tricky to balance anti-tanking measures with serving genuine need in the basement of the league, because objective measures can and will be abused to game the system. For some reason, we're stuck on using objective measures to determine draft order.
Subjective measures (specifically, a front office ranking-by-vote to determine draft order for each draft) can both serve genuine need and eliminate tanking. This would serve genuine need because front offices know which teams are good and which teams aren't, and they are incentivized to make sure that the best players go to the worst teams, because the opposite makes it harder for their own team to win. And it would eliminate tanking because there's no objective measure to be gamed. Again front offices, unlike W/L algorithms, know which teams are missing their best players; they know which teams are going to improve next year as young players develop; they know which teams can sign big free agents in the offseason and which teams are not going to be in the running for them; they can look one, two, and five years down the road and say "We have to give an advantage to somebody, but who do we give it to?" The answer is obviously the teams that need it most. Not OKC this year (with their unprotected Clippers pick), not the Spurs the year Robinson went down, etc.
But, we're all stuck on the idea that actual wins and losses have to mean something in draft order, so we've had well over a decade of bad suggestions that aren't going to work and never simultaneously tackle both goals of serving the needs of the genuinely bad teams in the league and eliminating tanking.
I've been screaming this to the sky for over ten years, but ain't nobody hearing it.
It's really tricky to balance anti-tanking measures with serving genuine need in the basement of the league, because objective measures can and will be abused to game the system. For some reason, we're stuck on using objective measures to determine draft order.
Subjective measures (specifically, a front office ranking-by-vote to determine draft order for each draft) can both serve genuine need and eliminate tanking. This would serve genuine need because front offices know which teams are good and which teams aren't, and they are incentivized to make sure that the best players go to the worst teams, because the opposite makes it harder for their own team to win. And it would eliminate tanking because there's no objective measure to be gamed. Again front offices, unlike W/L algorithms, know which teams are missing their best players; they know which teams are going to improve next year as young players develop; they know which teams can sign big free agents in the offseason and which teams are not going to be in the running for them; they can look one, two, and five years down the road and say "We have to give an advantage to somebody, but who do we give it to?" The answer is obviously the teams that need it most. Not OKC this year (with their unprotected Clippers pick), not the Spurs the year Robinson went down, etc.
But, we're all stuck on the idea that actual wins and losses have to mean something in draft order, so we've had well over a decade of bad suggestions that aren't going to work and never simultaneously tackle both goals of serving the needs of the genuinely bad teams in the league and eliminating tanking.
I've been screaming this to the sky for over ten years, but ain't nobody hearing it.
I hate the idea of the owners voting for draft order. Owners are billionaires that have NBA franchises as hobby projects. You're inevitably going to have draft order determined by billionaire interpersonal/business dynamics. Why would you want this? The league isn't about the owners, they're supposed to be the wallet, not the focus of attention.
In short, yuck
Well, now you have a harder problem of figuring out a way to firewall team execs from their owners. Good luck with that one.Front offices, not owners.
The salary cap seems like the right mechanism for incentivizing. It doesn't solve for the incentive to try and grab an obvious GOAT candidate, like LeBron or Wembanyama, but maybe those guys don't happen often enough that it's too much of a problem.Without something as extreme as relegation, which would threaten revenue sharing and likely eliminate tanking, I’d want to see the NBA add small, progressive incentives tied to success. Right now, the system mostly rewards losing through draft picks.
Every year, teams like The Beam Team grind their way into the 6–8 seed, show real growth, and then stall out in the playoffs. The league should reward that progress. Minor draft bonuses, cap flexibility, or roster exceptions for making the playoffs or improving year over year would give those teams something to build on.
It would discourage tanking and reward teams that actually compete, even potentially incentivize star players to stay with their team and rise up above with them if they restructure the salary and all those silly aprons.
Well, now you have a harder problem of figuring out a way to firewall team execs from their owners. Good luck with that one.
That would have to involve every owner then. If one owner wants a particular player and works to undermine this, the other 28 teams aren't going to go along with a scheme like this to benefit that owner. There's no benefit to them to do it.I feel like cronyism would creep in as well as strategies like intentionally keeping a middling team with a top 5 player down so said player winds up wanting out and potentially onto your team.
That would have to involve every owner then. If one owner wants a particular player and works to undermine this, the other 28 teams aren't going to go along with a scheme like this to benefit that owner. There's no benefit to them to do it.
No system is perfect. The current one is better than previous ones that further incentivized tanking but still isn't "great".
I feel like cronyism would creep in as well as strategies like intentionally keeping a middling team with a top 5 player down so said player winds up wanting out and potentially onto your team.
The league is reasonably successful at competitive balance (recently); the “voting” proposal is about getting rid of tanking.Well, in that case, you might as well ignore every attempt at achieving competitive balance, since the league's Board of Governors is... made up of the 30 team owners
For any incentive. I am convinced it would often be for non-basketball reasons. You give arbitrary power, and people will engage in arbitrage. (these are billionaires after all; they are familiar with the concept of arbitrage.)You're imagining that, in the event NBA front offices vote to determine the draft order for the 14 picks that go to the non-playoff teams, the owners are going to collude to keep top draft picks from going to the teams who need them most... for what incentive, precisely?
Again, might as well never work to improve an existing system that is already flawed if every edge case is going to frighten you away from progress. Nobody had to artificially attempt to keep the Milwaukee Bucks down so that Giannis would want out; we're already there, with the Bucks doing a fine job botching their own efforts to build a sustainable contender in the lesser conference. As @Warhawk noted above, you're going to need a significant number of votes in order to achieve this level of cronyism in a system like the one @Capt. Factorial has suggested, and there just isn't enough incentive for front offices/ownership groups to try and rig things their way prior to votes being cast.
What incentive would the Thunder have to incentivize the Rockets to get a better draft pick than the Clippers or Kings? Why would the Pistons vote for the Magic to get a better pick than the Wiz or Pacers? The teams at the top don't want the other good teams to get a decent pick. That challenges their position in the rankings over time.I think you're underestimating how far people will go and how creative they can get when it's their job to figure out how to take advantage of the system. The amount of situations and variables they can plan and account for is way beyond what we could conceivably come up with in a short conversation on a forum.
You wouldn't need a significant number of votes. Just a few votes could send a team falling down the draft order enough to be out of range of any obvious franchise players. That could easily be done by a few GMs calling each other and giving each other the wink wink. I personally think that is much more dangerous to the integrity of the league than bad teams playing bad players to stay bad for a chance at a crack at a good player.
Even if it’s not straight cash, it’s favors, sway and soft power. It’s always a good idea to make a good impression with somebody 10 times richer than you are, even if they aren’t literally buying your vote.What incentive would the Thunder have to incentivize the Rockets to get a better draft pick than the Clippers or Kings? Why would the Pistons vote for the Magic to get a better pick than the Wiz or Pacers? The teams at the top don't want the other good teams to get a decent pick. That challenges their position in the rankings over time.
I'm obviously not saying, in theory, that something like this isn't technically feasible. But the Thunder (for instance) will get a lot more $$$ from a deep playoff run and potential championship than some owner slipping them a couple of million for a vote. They WANT the championship - their egos feed off competition and winning (look at the methods reportedly used to draw in players by paying them outside their contracts). If they can help keep the other good teams around them mediocre, then they will do that. They aren't going to slit the throat of the goose that is laying THEM the golden egg.
Also, make it an automatic disqualification for the PO, or forfeit draft picks, or impose severe financial penalties if such activity is found. There are ways to enforce it if you really want to.
Also, the intent isn't to necessarily guarantee that the Kings and Wiz and Pacers and Clippers and Pelicans get the bottom 5 spots in a particular order, just that the teams that are legitimately bad (not tanking, just legitimately uncompetitive) get the best picks. The intent is to help prevent the Mavs or Grizz or Hawks or Heat from swooping in to get the pick.
Also, they can take into account that the Pacers should get their all-star back after surgery recovery and be good again, for instance. Helps prevent the Spurs little trick of getting both the Admiral and Timmy due to one year of injury.
What incentive would the Thunder have to incentivize the Rockets to get a better draft pick than the Clippers or Kings? Why would the Pistons vote for the Magic to get a better pick than the Wiz or Pacers? The teams at the top don't want the other good teams to get a decent pick. That challenges their position in the rankings over time.
I'm obviously not saying, in theory, that something like this isn't technically feasible. But the Thunder (for instance) will get a lot more $$$ from a deep playoff run and potential championship than some owner slipping them a couple of million for a vote. They WANT the championship - their egos feed off competition and winning (look at the methods reportedly used to draw in players by paying them outside their contracts). If they can help keep the other good teams around them mediocre, then they will do that. They aren't going to slit the throat of the goose that is laying THEM the golden egg.
Also, make it an automatic disqualification for the PO, or forfeit draft picks, or impose severe financial penalties if such activity is found. There are ways to enforce it if you really want to.
Also, the intent isn't to necessarily guarantee that the Kings and Wiz and Pacers and Clippers and Pelicans get the bottom 5 spots in a particular order, just that the teams that are legitimately bad (not tanking, just legitimately uncompetitive) get the best picks. The intent is to help prevent the Mavs or Grizz or Hawks or Heat from swooping in to get the pick.
Also, they can take into account that the Pacers should get their all-star back after surgery recovery and be good again, for instance. Helps prevent the Spurs little trick of getting both the Admiral and Timmy due to one year of injury.
Maybe a hard cap for rookie scale contracts? (A #1 pick would use up most of your rookie cap space, preventing teams from stockpiling lottery picks)I do think some system where you take multiple years records into account - which could include GM voting - is preferable to one down year allowing a team to stockpile. I also think that a team winning a top 4 pick three years in a row after getting a Wemby and a free Fox should not happen. Dallas situation is also ... strange.
I'm also not keen on rewarding teams that always seem to get lotto luck but blow it (Charlotte, New Orleans certainly).
Maybe opposed to the GM thing if there was a way of less arbitrarily rating the strengths and needs of each roster.
There's also the idea of ending the draft that @Mr. S£im Citrus has suggested and imposing a real hard cap. Maybe you give teams priority signing based on record but a player still has to agree to terms.
I do think there should be a balance against incentivizing the worst record and putting out an unwatchable product and a team trying. Kings interestingly seem to have done both this year?
I don't think stock piling picks is an issue. It's the teams with their own picks that cause the tanking. In fact, trading the pick is a reason not to tank.Maybe a hard cap for rookie scale contracts? (A #1 pick would use up most of your rookie cap space, preventing teams from stockpiling lottery picks)
The "voting" proposal is about both maximizing competitive balance and minimizing tanking.The league is reasonably successful at competitive balance (recently); the “voting” proposal is about getting rid of tanking.
The "voting" proposal is about both maximizing competitive balance and minimizing tanking.
To truly get rid of tanking, you have to dissociate team record from draft position. Any algorithm that takes wins and losses into account can be gamed by tanking. But any arbitrary method of determining draft position means a hit to competitive balance, because good teams have the same chance at getting a top pick as bad teams.
Even preventing teams from getting successive high picks, which lots of folks seem to like the idea of, doesn't do a lot for either - teams can and will tank basically the same as they do now if they're eligible for a high pick (the caveat that teams might not tank in a bad draft year in order to tank in a good draft year may be true but doesn't actually change the tank situation); teams that are truly bad are prevented from getting as much competitive balance "help" as the may need.
It's difficult to use the draft to help maintain competitive balance and eliminate tanking, and I haven't seen a proposal that I think has a better shot at actually doing both than the voting proposal.
I'm not really worried about "collusion" concerns, as it could be punished severely. Since 30 teams would have equal weight in the votes, one team going rogue couldn't cause more than a one-draft-pick move, hardly enough to risk collusion penalties. Start getting five or six teams involved, and the number of people who can accidentally spill the plot grows, so the risk gets even higher. Better for teams to just work in their own self-interest, and if they all do, then the system should work perfectly.